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SEANA SHIFFRIN’S THINKER-BASED
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A RESPONSE
Vincent Blasi*
As an instinctive consequentialist so far as First
Amendment theory is concerned, I have to admit that I have
never been so tempted by a non-consequentialist account as I am
by what Professor Shiffrin has produced. My principal interest is
the history of ideas regarding the freedom of speech. I have long
been struck by how so many of the canonical writers on the
subject have built their arguments from the starting point of the
central importance of the freedom of thought. This is true of
1
2
Milton and Mill in a basic, explicit, straightforward way (if
3
Milton can ever be called “straightforward”), and of Holmes,
4
5
Brandeis, and Meiklejohn in more complicated (and
disputable) ways. Of the major Anglo-American theorists of free
speech, only Madison and Learned Hand do not glorify the
independent-minded individual thinker, but they both rest their
arguments for free speech on the central importance of
6
meaningful political consent. So I think Shiffrin’s project fits
well with the inheritance, if that matters.
I also think that she has done an excellent job of explaining
how the shift of emphasis that she urges has significant
implications for doctrinal structure and priorities, as well as for

* Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School.
1. See John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing
(1644), in 2 THE COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 485, 560 (Ernest Sirluck
ed., 1959).
2. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
ed., 2003).
3. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”)
4. See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
5. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 8–28 (1960).
6. See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS 608, 652–53 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F.
535, 540 (1917) (Hand, J.).

309

!!BLASI-272-RESPONSETOSEANASHIFFRIN3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

10/11/2011 3:36 PM

310

[Vol. 27:309

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
7

justifying particular case outcomes such as Barnette and casting
8
doubt on others (Virginia Board of Pharmacy ? Citizens
9
United ?) Moreover, I find convincing several of her arguments
regarding how her version of an autonomy theory of free speech
has certain advantages over rival autonomy accounts.
I have two misgivings. The first relates to the kind of person
who would benefit most from the freedom that Shiffrin’s
intriguing version of autonomy is designed to advance. One of
the attractive features of the conventional arguments for free
speech from autonomy—arguments centered on notions such as
dignity, decency, and consent; arguments largely about human
beings being treated as ends not means—is that all persons
benefit from having their autonomy respected, and benefit in
roughly similar ways. In shifting the focus from speaking and
listening to thinking, Shiffrin’s novel autonomy argument may
sacrifice that advantage to a degree. My second misgiving relates
to her persuasive claim that the understanding of autonomy that
she offers provides a more comprehensive, unified foundation
for the protection of speech than is provided by rival versions of
the argument from autonomy. I wonder whether having such a
comprehensive, unified foundation is highly desirable, as she
assumes. I should say at the outset that I consider my second
misgiving the more significant of the two.
My first misgiving bears a resemblance to a problem that
10
some readers have with Mill. After sketching his paragon of the
truly open-minded thinker, tolerant yet passionate and
committed, courageously ready to follow his intellect wherever it
leads him, if necessary willing to defy convention and proceed
alone in the face of scorn, Mill announces that:
Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that
freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as
much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human
11
beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of.

Missing from his account, however, is an explanation of how
“average human beings” are to achieve the breadth of
understanding and empathy and the degree of self-discipline
7. West Virginia Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8. Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
9. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. See EDWARD ALEXANDER, MATHEW ARNOLD & JOHN STUART MILL 129
(1965); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 67–73 (1967).
11. MILL, supra note 2, at 102.
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necessary to meet Mill’s demanding standard of fully engaged
open-mindedness. Much as he sincerely desires to “raise[] even
persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity
12
of thinking beings,” the question persists whether the freedom
that Mill defends is of much greater value to people like himself
and his ilk than to other persons whose abilities, aspirations, and
patterns of living are less remarkable or differently directed.
Clearly Shiffrin believes that the thinker-oriented freedom
she defends is of great value to persons with no intellectual
pretensions, persons who simply need to think in order to figure
out how to survive, hopefully flourish, do their moral duty, and
be recognized for who they are by cohorts who may not value
intellectual achievement at all. But is she right? Of course such
people need to think. And of course such people deserve, as a
basic moral proposition, some measure of respect for their
humanity, dignity, and desire for self-authorship. The question is
whether for their flourishing and recognition they need to
develop, as fully and freely as Shiffrin believes is required, the
particular capacities that her thinker-centered conception of the
freedom of speech privileges.
Because she is making a non-consequentialist argument,
Shiffrin has a more demanding burden of persuasion on this
point than Mill, who claims that his argument ultimately rests on
collective consequences, “the permanent interests of man as a
13
progressive being.” The reason he gives for wanting to raise
persons of ordinary intellect to the ranks of thinking beings is
because his reading of history tells him that only in the
14
do
atmosphere of “an intellectually active people”
15
improvements “in the human mind or in institutions” occur. If
Mill is right about this, if broad-based intellectual independence
and energy is valuable primarily for its contribution to the
collective benefit of “progress,” we all gain from the freedom of
thought, at least indirectly. That is true even for those of us who
do not value or practice the intellectual skills that a robust
protection for the freedom of speech can help to develop.
Consequentialist arguments of a different stripe, resting on such
16
collective goods as political stability (Madison), adaptability

12. Id.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. at 102.
15. Id. at 103.
16. See Madison, supra note 6, at 631–58.
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(Holmes) , or the discharge of political responsibility
18
19
(Brandeis, Meiklejohn ) share the feature of attempting to
protect and promote something that almost all persons value and
have a stake in. So also does the “more is always better” listenercentered argument, recently in vogue in First Amendment
thought, that any raw, quantitative increase in the fund of public
communication is salutary without regard to calculations of
utility, integrity, quality, or just distribution, simply because
various people can draw on that fund in selective, multifarious,
20
unpredictable ways.
So my question is: why should we believe that persons other
than intellectuals, reformers, students, and artists would benefit
directly, in a manner that bears on their personal autonomy,
from a First Amendment that is designed to place the emphasis
on thinking rather than speaking and/or listening? Can it be that
for most persons the development of the mental capacities on
which Shiffrin bases her theory is as important as, say, respect
for their dignity or enrichment of the menu of choices available
to them as self-authoring individuals? Perhaps her implicit
contention is that vigorous support for the development of those
mental capacities actually is the key to respecting dignity and
enriching the experience of choice, not just for persons with
certain skills and interests but for all persons. For that to be true,
however, the capacities that Shiffrin invokes cannot be too
demanding or too specialized lest the benefits of her version of
autonomy be concentrated on a favored class of citizens.
As someone who has both taught a course and co-authored
21
an article with her, I am the last person who would suspect
Seana Shiffrin of constructing a social or moral argument with
insufficient attention to the needs of ordinary persons. She is
careful to specify that she values the freedom of speech not only
for its contribution to the development of rational capacities but also
“emotional capacities,” “perceptual capacities,” and “capacities
22
of sentience,” all of which, she claims, require for their develop17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24–33,
44–46 (2005).
18. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5, at 8–28.
20. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–08 (2010).
21. Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
22. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
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ment “the ability to transmit the contents of one’s mind to
23
others.” Moreover, when she speaks of “intellectual capacities”
she includes exercises of the imagination and “the intellectual
24
prerequisites of moral relations,” so she has in mind capacities
desired and possessed by persons who in no way consider
themselves intellectuals.
That said, her argument depends heavily on a claim about
how “external representation” aids the development of “a
complex mental world,” “sufficiently complex ideas,” and
25
“complex thought.” Now, persons who possess “ordinary”
mental abilities and who live “ordinary” lives no doubt have to
grapple with various complexities. Their personal challenges and
constraints are laced with contingencies, their thoughts and
desires and commitments and resentments are layered. But in
learning to cope with the complexities they confront, do most
people really need to nurture the particular mental capacities
that Shiffrin places at the center of her thinker-based theory? I
wonder. The skills of articulate self-presentation, inquisitive and
empathetic observation, and undistorted introspection that she
privileges strike me as disproportionately useful to persons of an
unusually imaginative or ruminative or provocative bent. In that
respect, Shiffrin’s autonomy argument grounded in mental
development seems to me less attractive on distributional
grounds than the conventional autonomy accounts that look
more to decency, dignity, consent, and opportunities for choice,
and that take people as they are.
I concede that the factor of how broadly distributed are the
benefits that are ascribed to free speech under various rationales
is a problematic basis for comparing theories. Distributional
concerns have almost never figured prominently in theoretical
inquiry about the freedom of speech, and for good reason. It is
all but impossible to measure in a meaningful way how the
benefits of free speech are distributed. Nevertheless, I think it is
worth raising distributional suspicions, even if one ought to be
loath to give them much weight for lack of feasible verification. I
might add that distributional concerns, should they be taken into
account, are more threatening to an autonomy argument than to
one based on collective consequences because autonomy by

CONST. COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011).
23. Id. at 291.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 292.
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definition is about what individuals have in common by virtue of
their humanity.
Where Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach does not raise
distributional concerns is in the way she builds upon the value of
sincerity. All of us, whatever our abilities, whether we are by
nature deliberative or instinctive, passive or proactive, patient or
impulsive, gregarious or reclusive, loquacious or reticent, need
to develop the discipline to mean what we say—to ourselves as
well as to others. Whether a well-established and fully enforced
principle of freedom of thought does much to promote the virtue
of sincerity is debatable. Are Americans more sincere in
personal relations, or in self-examination, than the Chinese or
the Cubans? Legal protection for heretical ideas can engender
disputational energy in a population. It can help to make
powerful actors accountable. But inducing or enabling people to
eschew dissembling, trimming, equivocating, and exaggerating is
an altogether more ambitious objective for a legal regime. Were
that objective to be realized, however, even in modest measure,
Professor Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to the freedom of
speech would have a distributional bona fides worthy of an
autonomy argument. All of us would benefit, and in the same
ways.
My second misgiving relates to Shiffrin’s claim that a
thinker-based rationale offers a “more comprehensive, unified
foundation for much of the freedom of speech protection than is
26
yielded by starting from a more partial intermediate point.”
Why exactly are the developmental objectives that she
emphasizes more foundational? Presumably the answer is that
the other goods (both individual and collective) that one might
invoke to justify a robust freedom of speech, whether respect for
the dignity of persons, or resources for listeners exercising
choice, or progress, or the prevention of political enormities, or
the satisfactions of participation, all depend on the ability of
individuals to respond to reasons and facts, apprehend what is
true, exercise their imaginations, practice moral agency, be
27
authentic, live among others, etc. True, but then I want to know
why being foundational in this sense is such a recommendation.
Does the fact that lots of different goods depend on the thinking
capacities that Shiffrin describes make freedoms directly related
to those capacities ipso facto more important than other
26.
27.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 288–291.
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(perhaps more narrowly tailored) freedoms that relate only to
capacities of a more specialized sort (say, political capacities or
the ability to energize others) that come into play at a later point
in the chain of inference?
To my mind, that the narrower capacities further down the
chain are not foundational but rather are targeted to serve
specific objectives counts in their favor. This is because the
larger project, as I see it, is one of identifying a limited number
of liberties that might properly constrain the majority will and
that can be robustly protected without extracting too great a cost
in terms of the multifarious social goods that free speech
inevitably impinges upon. It seems evident that a system of
constitutional protections keyed to the nourishing of specialized
capacities will occupy a narrower footprint, and thus impose
fewer social costs, than will a more ambitious, comprehensive
system of protections focused on foundational capacities.
Admittedly, an autonomy theory is not committed to counting
the costs in the way that a consequentialist theory is. But that
hardly means that an understanding of the freedom of speech
should be preferred on the ground that its implications, some of
which entail the imposition of social costs, are broader.
When Shiffrin contrasts the foundational and the
intermediate she is referring not only to the difference between
“comprehensive” capacities and more specialized ones, but also
between goods that are intrinsically valuable and those that are
only instrumentally so, such that the latter type of good depends
on an empirical connection that might be disputed and certainly
is contingent. She asserts that “[a] good free speech theory
should identify a non-contingent and direct foundation for its
28
protection.” Perhaps we can say that the free and full
development of the mental capacities on which she builds her
argument is self-evidently good and also self-evidently advanced
by the kinds of free speech rights she derives from her argument,
while the justifications for a robust freedom of speech offered by
the likes of Milton, Madison, Mill, Holmes, and Brandeis depend
on empirical, and even normative, claims relating to collective
consequences that are far more dubious and certainly more
time-bound. I do confess to being nervous about my
consequentialist inclinations on just this score. On the other
hand, some consequentialist claims are more controversial than
others. Those advanced by Madison relating to the prevention of
28. Id. at 286.
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major political transgressions and by Holmes relating to the
value of adaptation to an ever-changing environment seem to
me to rival, on the score of normative appeal and enduring
empirical grounding, the claims on which Shiffrin builds her
theory. I remain puzzled why, in the domain of free speech
theory, “contingent” should function as an epithet, even as I
understand why “speculative” should.
Shiffrin also defines “foundational” to mean that among the
various forms of expression that she lists (dissent, religious
speech, fiction, art, music, diaries, etc.) “there should not be a
29
lexical hierarchy of value.” She wishes to “avoid the
convolutions” that complicate any First Amendment analysis
30
that employs hierarchies of value and attends to contingencies.
I sympathize with her desire. The passage of almost thirty years
has done nothing to discredit William Van Alstyne’s observation
in 1982 that First Amendment doctrine was becoming as
31
complicated as the Internal Revenue Code. My own belief that
the First Amendment should be outfitted to do service in
pathological periods led me on one occasion to extol the virtues
32
of doctrinal simplicity on grounds of strategic efficacy. But
Shiffrin’s desire to minimize hierarchy and contingency in free
speech theory seems to be based on deeper concerns. And she is
not alone. As Robert Post has noted, in modern times we have
witnessed what might be called the “speech as such”
33
movement. There seems to be a powerful desire to embrace
formal rather than functional criteria in delineating the ambit of
First Amendment concern. I certainly don’t want to libel
Professor Shiffrin by calling her a formalist, but I do think that
she needs to say more, in a functionalist vein, to justify her
assertion that a thinker-based view of the First Amendment is to
be preferred in part because it leads to both a more unitary and
less contingent set of doctrines and case outcomes.
I suppose my various misgivings all come down to the crude
belief that, except in periods and places of rare societal selfconfidence, the gesture of protecting threatening or infuriating
acts of communication is difficult to pull off. In this view, the
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id.
31. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber,
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 309 (1983) (reporting a private conversation with Van Alstyne).
32. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
33. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1279 (1995).
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First Amendment is strong medicine that needs, like antibiotics,
to be rationed. That makes me suspicious of foundationalism
and attracted to an instrumentalist approach that emphasizes
priorities and practicalities.

